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OPEN DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR KARJALA: We, I think, have now another good
example of the other danger of Feist. We have talked for some time
about the underprotection that may result from Feist for works that
perhaps need some protection. Now the Feist emphasis on creativity
shows the danger of overprotection, and we see it arising in a number
of examples that just came up. In Bellsouth, for example, the business
classifications system was held to be copyright protected.
Now, as Mr. Odozynski has indicated, the court should have
looked for whether the classification scheme was original, but more
fundamentally there is problem, I think, in protecting these business
classifications because they are functional. Some are more useful to
users of yellow pages than others, and, besides, there is a real social
value in having standardization; you really do not want the yellow
pages to be different whenever you go to a different city. So I would
suggest that, even if there were some new additions to the standard
yellow page classifications, we should have serious reservations about
according copyright protection just because they were clever enough to
put new classifications in.
But we are seeing this now in various cases. There was another
case, I forget the name of it. I think it was decided by Judge Winter in
the Second Circuit where the yellow pages were for the Chinese community in New York, and he pointed out that the choice to use a heading for bean sprouts and bean curd was a kind of creative thought by
the plaintiff. I think that is a fairly obvious choice. If you like Chinese
food like I do, that would be a fairly obvious classification choice and it
may not be creative.
But, even if it were creative, I do not think it should be the protected property of the first one who happens to think of it, any more
than the first person who happens to put hospitals on a map should get
protected just because it turns out to be a very useful map. People may
really want to have maps with hospitals on them. I do not think that
mapmakers ought to get copyright protection just because of creative
selection of items shown on the map.
Functional works of all kinds should be protected, if at all, by patent law. We do protect some under copyright for reasons I will not go
into now. I will get into it a bit tomorrow. But we should be cautious
about using copyright to protect function. I think Kregos is a very good
example of the kind of problem that you run into, where the court protects a format for presenting statistical information. That is what it
is-a system for presenting information. I do not care how creative it
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is, it should not be copyright protected if it is excluded by section
102(b).
With Feist's emphasis on creativity, the courts are going around
looking for creativity and protecting it wherever they find it without
inquiring into the other limitations on copyright protection: Functionality, 102(b); limited protection of the facts, they are all there. So we
should not be looking just for creativity in determining what is copyright protected.
Suppose Kregos had gone beyond just supplying the nine categories he happened to choose. (In fact, he did not just happen to choose
them-he was making gradual improvements over prior forms. The
opinion makes this very clear. There was only one additional statistic
that he included that had not been included in the other forms. Improvements had been coming out over the years as to what users of
these forms really wanted and that is how this-thing was developing.)
Suppose he had been really clever and had worked out a formula that
you take, say, the earned run average for the last three games, and the
men on base average, and you combine them in a particular way and
you end up with the probability of victory, suppose also that this happens to be an accurate formula. I think most people would conclude
that that formula could' not be protected. It is functional. It is a system
for predicting the outcome of baseball games. We would not copyright
protect it in any of its aspects, including the nine elements. You are not
free to choose the nine elements. If this is the formula that works, these
are the ones that you must use.
Now the same thing is true in the actual case. He was not smart
enough to supply the actual formula, but he is suggesting that these are
the statistics that readers really want to know about if they are going
to bet on a baseball game. So I suggest that they are functional. He
has created a system for presenting information. It should have been
excluded completely from protection by section 102(b), and the Feist
emphasis on creativity is what threw us in this box.
That argument wins, right?
MR. McDONALD: I hate to see anybody win without a contest,
but I suspect that there are others.
THE CHAIRMAN: He is on your side, is he not?
MR. McDONALD: I have trouble deciding what side I am on. I
am not sure that your equation example works. If you take an equation, an algorithm, I suppose if it were reduced down to elemental
forms, a single equation that properly captured the universe, then that
would be the only way of expressing it. But on the other hand, since
that equation has not been found, and an equation is simply a shorthttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/16
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hand way of expressing your view of what a relationship is, and to that
extent, I have trouble seeing why that should not be protected.
Perhaps I like Whelan a bit too much, but I think some of his
analysis works there. If you are going to have expression, it ought to be
protected unless you are down to the sole way of saying it or you have
said it in such a mundane way that there is nothing very creative about
it that would make it worth protecting.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: You would agree that E equals MC
squared is not protected?
MR. McDONALD: God, I failed that course.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Or do I have to call it F equals MD
squared in order to be safe? Must I use a different set of symbols?
MR. McDONALD: I think that represents a problem because I
am not sure it fully captures the relationship.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: We do not know whether E equals
MC squared is true. With the current state of knowledge we think it is
probably true, but they used to think the relationship was something
else. Can we say it is just Einstein's opinion? You can have your opinion? I think maybe F should equal MC cubed or whatever, but the fact
is that no one would say only Einstein can talk about that particular
equation, even though it is only a theory. He may very well be wrong.
But I do not think we give it copyright protection. We do not even
give patent protection for a formula like that. We might. It is a legitimate view, I suppose, that we ought to protect it. But I certainly do not
think we should. And if you do not believe we should protect basic
scientific equations of this type, then I do not see the basis for protecting lesser discoveries.
We are not all Einsteins. But if somebody figures out some sort of
a formula for combining a certain set of factors in order to predict
earthquakes in California, China, or wherever, that is a very useful
kind of tool. You cannot just throw it in with whatever you feel like. If
somebody has done some empirical work to determine the set of factors
that is useful and predictive, right now, that is the best we know. If you
are going to say that "selection" of factors is protected as a compilation, then only one person gets to use this highly functional work. I do
not think that is the state of copyright law today. The question is
whether you can see the analogies between the earthquake predictors
and the Kregos situation.
This Kregos stuff is kind of trivial. So, we say, oh, well, it is not
very important; it is gambling and it is illegal in most places, so we do
not worry about it. But I think the problem is really deeper than that.
Take the Dow Jones Industrial Average. That might not be a very
accurate
predictor of1991
what the economy is doing or what the stock marPublished
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ket is doing, but it is somebody's best shot at it and now it has become
a standard. You can say, well, someone else can choose thirty more
corporations if he or she wants to, there is no need to choose the Dow
Jones companies. Sure, you can always choose others, but maybe theirs
are the best. We just do not know, and that is why we should not protect it with copyright, especially not for seventy-five or a hundred
years. That is too long for functional works.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: In response, I guess maybe I misconstrued
what Professor Karjala was saying. But the fact that Kregos' compilation had facts and had functional aspects, does not deprive it of
copyrightability any more than any other work that has some functional aspects.
The whole debate in Kregos was about whether or not it was, in
fact, determinable that-first of all, Kregos did not have a formula and
he did not suggest a formula, but even if he had hypothesized a
formula, the debate was about whether or not Kregos' formula or
Kregos' compilation of statistics were, in fact, accurate enough or particular enough to be the only ones that were useful. In fact, what they
really were, were his opinion that these statistics somehow had relevance to picking the outcome of a baseball game.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: That is true of any assumptionMR. ODOZYNSKI: NoPROFESSOR KARJALA: -with any scientist.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: No, that is not true. That is not true with
the formula that says E equals MC squared because although we may
doubt about whether in fact it is, in fact, scientifically true, or demonstrably scientifically true, we believe it, and there is a limited range of
expression with which we express that underlying idea.
In fact, if Kregos' idea were appropriately and properly that these
statistics, that statistics are useful to predict the outcome of a baseball
game, then as a majority says, I suppose some tongue in cheek, if you
assume there are only twenty available statistics to characterize pitcher
performance, you can take nine of those in 167,000 different ways. So,
in fact, to render exclusively Kregos' one of 167,000 now is not much
of an exclusive right, especially in view of the fact that there is no way
to determine that these nine are better than any other nine.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: We can make that number one in a
billion, by adding more statistics. What time did the pitcher get up on.
the morning that he pitched?
MR. ODOZYNSKI: Sure.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Was the sun shining? And a whole
bunch of other things. You can keep on expanding this thing forever.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/16
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You can choose all you want. It can be one in a trillion. You can make
the number as small as you want.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: They are functional only to the extent that
they are accurate or useful because otherwise they are conjecture and
opinion and susceptible to any number of ways of expression. If we,
rather than apply what the individual thinks are our own views of what
ought to be and what ought not to be copyrightable, but in fact apply
copyright doctrine, i.e., idea/expression merger, then- you say there is
an unlimited or a very large number of ways of expressing this idea.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Is this a system?
MR. ODOZYNSKI: No, it is not a system.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Oh, it is not.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: He has suggested a system. A system would
be as Professor Karjala has suggested, you take ten percent of his
earned run average, fifteen percent of his won/loss record, you know
ten percent of time of the day, ten percent of his record against that
team, and you have a formula and you have a quantity. What he has is
a collection of statistical items. He does not have a system.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Is it a system to just obtain the results
if it does not predict them with that kind of specificity?
MR. ODOZYNSKI: How would you define a system? What is it?
All he has is a suggestion that nine statistics are useful. If he were to
have system, he would tell you how to divide them and how to make a
determination. He has not even gone so far as to tell you how to make
a determination. That is, you take these nine statistics with respect to
this pitcher, these nine with respect to this pitcher, and he does not
even tell you enough to allow you to make a determination as to who
should win on that day. So, how you can characterize that as a system
is a little difficult for me to perceive.
THE CHAIRMAN: Jessica Litman was interjecting some comments there or had some comments.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Only the comment, it seemed to me
that we were illustrating the point that Dennis [Karjala] was making
earlier that somehow we were looking at: "Is this creative, are there
other ways to say it," and not at some of the other limitations we have
on copyrightable subject matter, and that this is a system for predicting
who is going to win baseball games, or at least it is sold as being useful
for helping people to ascertain which of two teams is more likely to
win.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: I think it would be a component of system,
but standing by itself I do not see how it does.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: The Court in Baker v. Selden never
that1991
accounting system was a good system or not, and
askedbywhether
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there are undoubtedly many, many ways of keeping account books,
both before and after Baker v. Selden. The court never inquired into
that. This is a way of keeping records. Those sheets were, what were
they? If you put the numbers in the right way, they were useful for
keeping accounts. Maybe there is an infinite number of ways you can
put numbers on paper to keep track of the records of a company. The
court never asked that question. The work is not copyrightable because
it is a functional system.
MR. HIX: I cannot let it close without asking this. Was the
formula not successful? Does the formula predict with any statisticalMR. ODOZYNSKI: There is no formula.
MR. HIX: Did it come out with useful knowledge being that I
could bet on?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Some people used it.
MR. HIX: Should be able to statistically determine whether it was
of any value whatsoever since that is abstracted.
THE CHAIRMAN: If I could ask a question. Are these nine categories that were listed in this form without any reference as to which
were the more important categories or the less important categories
and no formula for aggregating them, just nine categories?
MR. ODOZYNSKI: No formula. These were just a compilation
of statistical items. And this is my argument, there was no system.
There was no way as in, for example, Baker v. Selden, where either the
text in conjunction with the forms or reading the forms alone were sufficiently explanative to tell you how to operate the accounting system.
This simply does not occur, and there is no way to divine it on the
simple setting forth of nine statistics. It simply is not a-system.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Let me make it clear for everyone.
Maybe some people have not read the Kregos case. We are not talking
about the actual numbers that appeared in the boxes. Those were recalculated every day by both sides.
We are talking about simply the form, which categories are you
using. That is the alleged compilation in this case and that is what I
am alleging is a system for presenting information and therefore excluded by section 102. The argument is not over the actual data that
goes in there on a specific game on a specific day. That is not what we
are talking about.
THE CHAIRMAN: I take it, Dennis [Karjala], that you are also
not concerned these nine categories there were ones that this person set
forth as being the ones that are most likely to be useful?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I think he decided that they were the
ones most likely to be useful and reportable-in the limited space provided by the newspaper. This form had percolated through the test of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/16
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use. A number of pitching forms that had been used in the past, and
Kregos used more categories than most of the prior people had used.
He invented one new category and there was a slight rearrangement in
presentation. So what you see here in all these pitching forms is what
you always see as useful products improve: people will add a little bell
here and a whistle there and things just get better. His form might not
be the ultimate one. Somebody else may come along and find a tenth
statistic that he can add or get rid of one and put another one in, and it
may be better. I am not saying that he had the best by any means, but
it is all part of a gradual progression.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: What the court, in fact, said that there was
one element in his compilation that was never used anyplace else. If, in
fact, there was another compilation that had eight of the nine elements
identically, and he had added only one, then I suppose I would have to
entertain that what he did, then, was not creative because it only differed by one. But, in fact, what he had was a compilation of nine elements, only one of which the court identified as never being used by
anybody any place. Now how that compilation differed in its entire
makeup from other compilations, I just do not know.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: It is in the district court's opinion-very little, if I remember.
PROFESSOR LANGE: This is not fair, but I would love to hear
Kurt Steele on this debate. Do you have a position on this?
MR. STEELE: Dennis [Karjala], to what degree are you comforted by the fact that, as I recall, the court in Kregos said that a very
small change in the statistical format would render the second work
non-infringing? I think you are quite right when you point out we are
not talking about the actual data elements but the scheme or organizational format for presenting them. But the Kregos court found only a
thin layer of protection for that.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: That, I think, is a very good example
of a really fundamental misconception of copyright by the court, which
misconstrued copyrightability with infringement. The court seems to
make small changes in the Kregos form, you yourself might have a new
work that would be copyright protected. It then assumes that if you
have a new copyright protected work, that work also would not infringe, which, of course, is nonsense. Any derivative work, almost by
definition, if it is just a small change, would infringe the work on which
it is based, unless the work on which it is based is in the public domain
already. So the Kregos court just had to be wrong on that because it
violates all basic copyright principles.
But I should indicate in fairness that even the dissent, in Kregos,
Published
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use pitching statistics to the predict the outcome of baseball games, I
might have to recognize a copyright." That is wrong, too. My view says
this is a functional tool and it is a 102(b) system. Section 102(b) excludes it from protection.
You said the copyright is thin, but even with a thin copyright, we
have a problem because we do not know when we are at the optimal
stage. At the end of this progressive line of development, what nine
statistics are going to be the ones that these gamblers really need?
Kregos may actually be there. Maybe this is it, and if he is, then he is
the last one, the one who finally puts that last piece in the puzzle. This
is a puzzle that has been building up for years. Now somebody has put
the last piece in-he has really got what the newspaper readers
want-and he is the one who collects royalties on it for a hundred
years.
MR. STEELE: I think Kregos is a very informing and basically
correct case. If we buy the Feist position in order to establish
copyrightability, minimal creativity need be found. I am persuaded that
out of the enormous number of different ways of selecting and organizing pitching statistics, that the plaintiff's particular way of doing that
did evidence the minimal creativity to be copyrightable.
Assuming that is the case, the issue switches to what is the scope
of protection. I think the Court said quite rightfully, short of there being virtually ideniical copying of that scheme, there should be no protection, and that even small changes would make it non-infringable.
I guess Dennis [Karjala] and I would part company right up front.
I think you are saying there is no copyrightability; I would say
copyrightability but with thin protection.
MR. McDONALD: The question, I guess, I pose as I sit here and
think about it, is what you think about the Nation decision, because,
fundamentally, you had President Ford writing his reasons why he
pardoned Nixon and certainly those writings are of historical importance. They certainly are writings that are historically based and the
way he wrote them was certainly important. And, of course, the court
there said that indeed, even though that was true, his manner of expression continued to be protected. If you take the equation, or take the
argument in that discussion, that is going on here, is that not the same
thing that you are saying, you did not like that decision?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I am not going to have anything left to
say tomorrow afternoon when I get up to talk. I addressed this briefly
in my paper.
What I am arguing really on all this is that once we have something that is a protected work, there must be a balance in determining
the scope of protection. We must balance functionality and factual inhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/16
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formation on one side against misappropriation-type piracy notions on
the other.
I think the only thing I disagree with about the Nation decision
was its emphasis on the unpublished -nature of the work, rather than on
more directly addressing what I think the court was really worried
about, which was timing. It was the timing of the Nation's theft, not
the actual taking, I think, that worried the Court. I personally believe
that if the Nation had published what they did one week after Time
Magazine had published its version, the Court would have found, and I
think should have found, a fair use.
I think you can handle that case through a fair use analysis because we can give very limited protection if you recognize that protection is necessary just while the news is hot. In other words, under a fair
use analysis, you are allowed to balance all the factors that are involved, including misappropriation, which favors protection and free
use of factual information. The latter is very important in the long
term. Historians, biographers, and scholars need access to that information sooner than seventy-five years, but they do not have to have it a
week before it is published. They can wait a little while.
And I think we can use fair use to balance these factors. So I do
not have any objection to the result in Harper & Row, but we have
seen what I think is a terrible result of its emphasis on the unpublished
nature of the work. Now we see that people who want to suppress the
information forever, like Salinger, get away with it because of the
Court's emphasis on the unpublished nature of the work.
So, we need to do some balancing. I would even give Kregos a
little protection. The very last section in my paper deals with blank
forms, and I give them protection against photocopying. Anyone ought
to be free to use the same categories, but not to photocopy somebody's
form for sale. At the very least, you ought to have to set your own type.
I see no social policy reason for not giving that level of protection. But
it is dangerous to go much beyond that level.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Dennis [Karjala], one thing you said I
would like you to clarify. Is functionality, as you use it, the predicate
for defining system in 102(b); if something is functional then it limits
the protection; is that correct?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: No, I do not think I can do that.
There are several examples of functional works that are clearly protected by copyright, so you cannot just look at function. Computer programs are the best example. Computers programs are purely functional, so there is no doubt that we protect some functional works to
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PROFESSOR RASKIND: Well, then, the question is how do you
distinguish them. So if I give you this hypothetical. I will give you
three objects in front of you: one of them is a Foundation Press' best
seller, Gunther's constitutional law case book; the other is a telephone
book, a yellow pages telephone book, privately made; and the third
would be a LEXIS printout of a Supreme Court opinion or court of
appeals opinion. Which of them is not equal? How does the functionality test work there? Which one of them is a function? You have got to
state the function.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: None.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: How do you know that?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I have got my own definition of
functionality.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: That is the point. What is it?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: I adopt the Copyright Act's definition
of a useful article. Basically, a useful article has an intrinsic utilitarian
function or purpose other than to portray itselfPROFESSOR RASKIND: If you ask Jerry Gunther, he would
say I cannot teach copyright out of these other books.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: -- other than to portray itself or to
convey information.
So a casebook is not a useful art within that definition, and since I
am writing the definition I will just tell you, my definition does not
include Gunther's case book.
But I also think that is what the statutory definition says. It is not
a useful article, but the scope of protection is thin-thinner protection
than a Ken Kesey novel. That is standard copyright law; that is not me,
although I happen to agree with it.
As for the Supreme Court opinion, we know Supreme Court opinions themselves are not protected. I suppose it is probably a fair use to
print out one case; even if LEXIS has added some annotations. But
dumping the whole LEXIS database into yours for competitive purposes, no, I do not think we should allow that, although you apparently
could do it as far as the Feist opinion is concerned.
And what was your third example?
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Telephone yellow pages.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: At least you cannot photocopy it, in
my view, but you can do almost anything else with the information it
contains. I give reasons for all this in greater length in my paper.
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